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Abstract 
Could pantomime have been the key step in the evolutionary emergence of symbolic 
communication? Such a possibility has been consistently present in the intellectual reflection 
on language origins. What makes pantomime interesting from this perspective is its rich 
expressive potential, since it can convey open-ended, semantically universal and displaced 
meanings without relying on semiotic conventions, so that spontaneous pantomimes can be 
recognized as such and successfully interpreted. Definitions are important in classifying a 
particular scenario as “pantomimic”. In this chapter, we employ a ‘rich’ definition of 
pantomime: we describe it as bodily-mimetic communication which is non-conventional, 
improvised, performed with the whole body, holistic, communicatively and semantically 
complex. Based on this foundation, we review and evaluate pantomimic accounts of language 
origins, from the past to the present, and we particularly focus on the contemporary 
pantomime accounts given by Michael Arbib, Michael Tomasello, and Jordan Zlatev. 
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Pantomimic Conceptions of Language Origins 
Pantomime, itself nonlinguistic, provides a credible stepping stone to the first 
hallmarks of language. In particular, pantomime can communicate an unlimited range of 
novel messages (is open-ended) that are not restricted to a particular topic (is semantically 
universal) nor to the immediate here-and-now (is displaced). This has not escaped the notice 
of influential authors, historical as well as contemporary, whose accounts of language origins 
can be classified as “pantomimic”.  
As with other scenarios in language evolution research, the evaluation of pantomimic 
scenarios ultimately depends on whether sufficient weight of converging multidisciplinary 
evidence (cf. Fitch, 2017; Wacewicz & Żywiczyński, 2015) can be mustered to make them 
convincing. This is the evidential question. But in the case of pantomimic scenarios the 
problem is more complex, because we cannot answer the evidential question without first 
answering the logically prior definitional question about the nature of pantomime. In the 
many literatures relevant to language evolution, the word “pantomime” is frequently used in a 
loose sense close to “gesture”; distinguishing these two notions, and correspondingly, gestural 
from true pantomimic theories is a difficult task that we address in Section 2, together with 
other thorny definitional issues. But we wish to note that this problem – to what extent a 
theory truly refers to the essence of pantomime, and to what extent only to the name – is a 
fundamental one that will recur throughout this chapter. 
 Mindful of this caveat, in sections 3 and 4 we provide an overview of historical and 
contemporary pantomimic accounts of language origins. Of them, Zlatev, Wacewicz, 
Żywiczyński, & van de Weijer’s (2017) pantomime-first deserves attention as perhaps the 
only unambiguously pantomimic proposal. However, we start with Michael Arbib’s (2005, 
2012, 2016) Mirror System Hypothesis, which is the best known and most detailed, and in 
many respects can be treated as a prototypical pantomimic scenario. We conclude by 
 
reviewing the criticisms of the role of pantomime in language origins and their polemical 
discussion. 
Definitions and Classifications 
One of the main axes of recent debates on the origins of symbolic communication is 
the question of the modality in which the proximate precursors of language arose (cf. 
Żywiczyński, Gontier, & Wacewicz, 2017). Pantomime-first and gesture-first theories 
emphasize the role of bodily/visual signaling, in which they differ from speech-first theories, 
and to a smaller degree, from multimodal theories (Figure 1). It is common in the literature to 
apply the adjective “gestural” very broadly (e.g. Corballis, 2013; Goodwin, 2017; Irvine, 
2016; Sterelny, 2012a; Tramacere & Moore, 2018), so as to include theories for which we 
consider the term visual/bodily much more accurate. Conversely, pantomime is often defined 
loosely as “iconic gesturing” (e.g. Brown, Mittermaier, Kher, & Arnold, 2019; Tomasello, 
2008), which however is imprecise and easily confusable with iconic co-speech gesture. A 
clear distinction between gesture and pantomime is rarely made, and many authors equivocate 
between the two (e.g. Corballis, 2014a, 2014b). This leads to the question of how to tell a 
“gestural” from a “pantomimic" scenario – and is there a meaningful difference? 
 As we show below, the separation of pantomime-first from gesture-first theories is not 
only possible but also theoretically productive; it rests both on the difference in meaning 




Figure 1. Language origins theories classified by their leading communicative modality. 
Speech-first or phonology-first theories of language origins maintain that human language 
arose from ancestral primate vocalizations, i.e. has always been primarily vocal-auditory 
(Dunbar, 1996; Burling, 2005; MacNeilage, 2008; Fitch, 2010). 
Gestural, or gesture-first, or gestural primacy theories are a group of theoretical accounts or 
scenarios which postulate that language or protolanguage began as a gestural communication 
system (Armstrong & Wilcox, 2007; Corballis, 2002a; Hewes, 1977). “Gesture” is sometimes 
used very broadly, and in most such cases visual/bodily theories would be a more accurate 
description. 
Multimodal theories of language origins can be seen as a middle-ground position, on which 
human communication has always been a complex of bodily movement accompanied by 
vocalization (Kendon, 2011; Levinson & Holler, 2014; McNeill, 2012; Sandler, 2013; see 
Goldin-Meadow, this volume). 
Mimetic theories, which we classify as essentially pantomime-first, are multimodal but with a 





 “Gesture” is an umbrella category hard to define in a clear and theory-independent 
way (Andrén, 2010). Across the diverse interdisciplinary literatures relevant to language 
evolution research, the uses of the term comprise a heterogeneous variety of qualitatively 
different forms of bodily action: from spontaneous hand movement accompanying speech, to 
glances, to postures, and even the orofacial gestures of the mouth area (e.g. Corballis, 2003), 
and multimodal gestures such as tactile and auditory gestures (e.g. Liebal & Oña, 2018).1 The 
founding father of modern gesture-first theories, Gordon Hewes (1996, p. 572), proposes a 
broad definition of gesture, inclusive of almost all visually perceived bodily communication. 
However, the everyday, intuitive meaning of “gesture” is much narrower, and 
connotes manual communicative movements that are perceived visually. Hewes (1996, p. 
572) recognizes this in his definition, noting that prototypical gestures are those performed by 
the fingers, hands and arms. 
Pantomime 
The technical meanings of pantomime vary across a considerable number of 
disciplines such as theatrical studies, anthropology, and neuroscience – some with centuries if 
not millennia of tradition (Żywiczyński, Wacewicz, & Sibierska, 2018). But pantomime has 
one main intuitive meaning, well established in popular discourse and understood without 
much terminological reflection: essentially, pantomime is speechless bodily enactment of 
events for communication and artistic performance. Prototypical real-life examples of 
pantomime can be found in theatre, ritual or bodily narratives of hunters-gatherers, and cannot 
be described as gestures. 
                                                 
1 Even articulatory gestures of the speech apparatus can sometimes be classified as gestures; for example, 
Armstrong & Wilcox (2007, p. 67) seem to imply that speech, as “planned sequences of musculo-skeletal 
actions”, is effectively a form of gesture. But as Kendon (2008, p. 13) observes, such a broad definition would 
also subsume cutting down trees or driving. 
 
In a recent paper (Żywiczyński et al., 2018), we advocated a more technical top-down 
definition of pantomime that preserves this basic meaning and facilitates terminological 
agreement; it is tailored for language evolution research, that is it describes spontaneous or 
naïve pantomime rather than heavily conventionalized systems like in the game of charades or 
performance of professional mimes. We posit that pantomime, as a communicative system, 
should be understood as a prototype category with fuzzy membership, and should be defined 
by the following features, ordered by importance: 
a) mimetic (comprising self-initiated bodily actions that are representational. i.e. stand for 
something else than themselves), with “pantomime” being indeed a near-synonym to 
mimetic communication; 
b) non-conventional (not relying on communicative norms) and motivated (pantomimic 
communication depends on the similarity between its form and intended meaning); 
c) primarily visual (making use of the motor-visual channel) but possibly multimodal to 
some extent (i.e. potentially accompanied by non-linguistic vocalization); 
d) whole-body action (involving the action of all the limbs, head and torso rather than 
being exclusively manual); 
e) holistic (consisting of unanalyzed continuous expression rather than built from discrete 
structural components); 
f) improvized (impromptu, unstandardized). 
We also proposed that for pantomime-first scenarios to work, pantomime should ideally meet 
the following additional criteria: 
g) communicatively complex and self-sufficient (being able refer to events and sequences 
of events without relying on other semiotic resources); 
 
h) semantically advanced (displaced, open-ended and domain-universal – capable of 
expressing potentially unlimited range of meanings that are not limited to the here-
and-now or to a predefined set of semantic domains).2 
In short, “gesture” naturally connotes manual movements that are perceived visually, 
but is underspecified with respect to its remaining characteristics. In contrast, “pantomime” 
stands for a whole-body communication system that is overspecified as mimetic, non-
conventional, holistic, and improvized (and ideally should have considerable expressive 
power). 
Gesture-First Theories: Mostly Manual 
Michael Corballis (2013, p. 171) summarizes the arguments favouring the gesture-first 
theories of language origins in the following way: 
a) the use of the hands as the more natural way to depict events in space and time; 
b) the ability of nonhuman primates to use manual action flexibly and intentionally; 
c) the nature of the primate mirror system and its homology with the language circuits in 
the human brain; 
d) the relative success in teaching apes to communicate gesturally rather than vocally;  
e) the ready invention of sophisticated signed languages by the deaf;  
f) the critical role of pointing in the way young children learn language; and  
g) the correlation between handedness and cerebral asymmetry for language.  
This could be complemented by several more arguments, many of them quite 
speculative. For example, Hewes (1996) conjectured that volar depigmentation (lighter 
coloration of the inside of the palm in darker-skinned populations) could have been selected 
for better manual communication. Other proposed links from manual action to language 
                                                 
2 The communicative effectiveness of such pantomime of course rests on both the producer’s ability to use 
pantomime to express meanings and, crucially, the receiver’s ability to interpret pantomime as bearing such 
meanings (see e.g. Arbib, 2012 and section 4.1.6 below). 
 
involve tool use (and instruction of tool use, Stout & Chaminade, 2012) or even ballistic 
movements; for example, Calvin identified the action of throwing stones to hunt small game 
as responsible for the emergence of a specialized neural circuit in the brain for manual 
movements, later exapted for grammatical patterns (Calvin & Bickerton, 2000). There is also 
a growing body of evidence that action gestures play a significant role in the acquisition of 
both spoken and signed languages (Volterra, Capirci, Rinaldi, & Sparaci, 2018). Wacewicz 
and Żywiczyński (2008) underscored the greater secrecy of gestural communication. Unlike 
sound, which is broadcast in all directions and easily overheard, gesture allows the producers 
to better control who receives the message; the possibility to transfer honest information only 
to one’s kin or allies could have played a role in the competitive social environment at the 
early stages of language emergence. 
Importantly for the present context, all of this argumentation supports specifically 
manual gesture rather than the broader category of visual/bodily communication. Only the 
first two points can be extended to reinforce whole-body pantomimic theories. Most 
importantly, point a), when interpreted as the greater natural iconicity of visual than vocal 
representations, works well for all bodily signals, manual or non-manual. 
Pantomime-First Theories: Whole-Body, Primary Iconicity 
Iconicity deserves special attention as arguably the most powerful argument 
summoned by the proponents of pantomimic scenarios. Iconicity is definitionally challenging 
but in the most general and theory-neutral sense it can be described as the type of 
representation that depends on some inherent resemblance between the form and intended 
meaning. Visual representations, including both gestures and pantomimes, are iconic when 
they “resemble” what they stand for, by means of schematically illustrating the salient 
structural properties of the represented objects or actions (e.g. a spiraling hand-movement 
 
representing the action of a helicopter’s rotor; Müller, 2014; see also Żywiczyński et al., 
2018).  
A longstanding argument in language evolution is that the iconic potential of visual 
representations is much greater than that of vocal ones (such as non-linguistic vocalizations), 
which makes visual representations more “natural” and thus better suited for getting linguistic 
communication off the ground (Stokoe, 1991; Armstrong & Wilcox, 2007). This line of 
thinking has recently gained support from empirical studies on novel communication systems 
(e.g. Fay, Arbib, & Garrod, 2013; Zlatev et al., 2017; although trace iconicity is also present 
in nonlinguistic vocalization, Perlman, Dale, & Lupyan, 2015). The proponents of gesture-
first scenarios elaborated arguments that specifically focus on the iconicity of gestures in the 
narrow sense, e.g. by showing how the shapes of gesturing hands resemble intended meanings 
or hypothesizing that gestures may have formed the rudiments of grammar, with the hands 
and arms instantiating the role of quasi-nouns and hand and arm actions, that of quasi-verbs 
(Stokoe, 1991; Armstrong, Stokoe, & Wilcox, 1995).  
In the case of pantomime, iconicity is closely related to the use of the whole body to 
represent events. For example, a pantomime of stone knapping involves the mime performing 
a simplified version of that motor routine without the functional effect, i.e. without actually 
knapping any stones (Gärdenfors, 2017). Importantly, whole-body representation involves 
much more primary iconicity (Sonesson, 1997) than manual-only representation, and so 
whole-body representations are less conventional and less schematic but more transparent: 
compare using the whole-body versus the index and middle fingers to communicate the action 
of walking. Pantomime understood in this way is a form of mimetic communication.  
Pantomime-First Versus Gesture-First Theories: Summary 
On the level of theoretical commitments, there are extensive similarities between the 
pantomime-first and gesture first theories, but also sufficient differences that the two point to 
 
different bodies of potential corroborating or falsifying evidence (see also Zlatev et al., 2017 
for pantomime-first versus prototypical multimodal-first). Their main similarity lies in their 
reliance primarily on the visual modality and on the natural iconic grounding that it provides 
to signals perceived visually. Here, the difference is in the degree, because this requirement is 
not as strict for pantomime-first – especially of the mimetic profile – which allow for a 
significant role of non-linguistic vocalization.  
A major difference lies in the emphasis of gesture-first theories on manual signaling, 
where an important commitment of pantomimic theories is in the use one’s entire body (with 
a nontrivial role of facial expression). This is a very significant difference with further 
consequences; for example, it makes pantomime highly expressive, but also difficult to 
produce and resistant to high-fidelity copying, and last but not least, energetically costly –  
which, as one example, makes pantomime suitable for implementing costly rituals (e.g. 
Power, 2009, p. 271). A major empirical difference relates to the ape baseline: non-human 
apes have very rich gestural communication but no pantomime (with possible rare exceptions: 
Russon, 2018). 
In sum, pantomime-first accounts form a coherent and theoretically useful category 
under two conditions:  
 pantomime fits a narrow definition, clearly distinguishing it from related notions (most 
importantly gesture); 
 pantomime has sufficient weight, i.e. functions as a pivotal rather than marginal 
element of that theory. 
These two conditions are not met in the works of gesture-first theorists such as Armstrong and 
Wilcox (2007) or Hewes (1996), who do occasionally refer to pantomime, but the bulk of 
their argumentation relates to manual communicative action. Likewise, Corballis (2002a, b) 
explicitly refers to manual gesture and not to pantomime, and much of his argumentation is 
 
grounded in neuroscientific data showing links between the neuronal representation of 
language or orofacial praxis and the cerebral control of the upper limb. In later works, 
Corballis (2014a, b) uses “pantomime” more frequently, but it is not clear whether this word 
choice is meant to have theoretical consequences. 
To a large extent, the above two conditions are met in several historical accounts and 
more contemporaneously in the works of Arbib (2012) and Tomasello (2008) as well as in the 
mimetic scenarios (esp. Donald, 1991; Zlatev, 2008). We review these in turn in the following 
sections. 
Pantomime in Language Origins: Historical Accounts 
The definitional problem of separating gestural from pantomimic scenarios was also 
present in traditional reflection on language origins. Giambattista Vico (1668–1744) is often 
identified as the father of gestural approaches (see Hewes, 1977). But what he describes in 
Scienzia Nuova (The New Science) as the earliest form of human communication – the so-
called language of gods – in fact depends on a variety of visual semiotic resources, including 
pantomime, which are used to convey concepts and relations between them. 
The philosophers and philologians should all have begun to treat of the origins of 
languages and letters from the following principles, (i) That the first men of the gentile 
world conceived ideas of things by imaginative characters of animate and mute 
substances. (2) That they expressed themselves by means of gestures or physical 
objects which had natural relations with the ideas; for example, three ears of grain, or 
acting as if swinging a scythe three times, to signify three years. (3) That they thus 
expressed themselves by a language with natural significations. (Vico, 1725/1948, pp. 
125–126) 
Today, it often goes unnoticed that later during the Enlightenment, there emerged a near 
consensus about the nature of pre-linguistic communication. Accordingly, it was believed that 
 
the first people had used the bi-modal system of communication, which combined non-
linguistic vocalization, usually of emotive character, with expressive body movement 
(Żywiczyński, 2018). The model version of this proposal was presented in the form of a 
thought experiment about pre-linguistic children who are isolated from the rest of humanity 
and have to discover language anew. The experiment shows how the first pair and their 
progeny gradually re-invent language. Although the first version of the experiment came from 
Bernard de Mandeville (1728), this is rarely mentioned by commentators. They instead focus 
on the formulation by Condillac (1746/2001), who portrays the children’s initial 
communicative attempts in the following way: 
When they lived together they had occasion for greater exercise of these first 
operations, because their mutual discourse made them connect the cries of each 
passion to the perceptions of which they were the natural signs. They usually 
accompanied the cries with some movement, gesture, or action that made the 
expression more striking. For example, he who suffered by not having an object his 
needs demanded would not merely cry out; he made as if an effort to obtain it, moved 
his head, his arms, and all parts of his body.3 (pp. 114–115) 
Just as Vico, Condillac is regularly portrayed as one of the forefathers of the gestural 
scenario of language emergence (e.g. Fitch, 2010). However, as the above fragment suggests, 
what he had in mind when writing about the precursor to language was whole-body 
multimodal expression, and not isolated expression of the hands and arms. The proposal that 
language arose out of the communication based on emotional vocalization and pantomime 
gained huge popularity in the 18th century, and was championed by such influential thinkers 
                                                 
3 Condillac explains that the usual context of these communicative attempts was absence of desired objects (e.g. 
“One day the sensation of hunger made these children call to mind a tree loaded with fruit which they had seen 
the day before”, Condillac, 1746/2001, p. 114); hence, the expressive movements of “head, arms, all body parts” 
should be interpreted as pantomime rather than pointing to physically present objects. 
 
as Rousseau, Diderot, Voltaire, Helvétius and the influential Parisian milieu known as Les 
Idéologues (Żywiczyński, 2018).  
 The type of reflection on language origins that flourished in the Enlightenment is 
sometimes referred to as naturalistic glottogeny (Żywiczyński, 2018). The term serves to 
indicate that it was focused on the problem of how humans could have discovered language 
on the basis of their own – natural – dispositions. As shown by the Mandeville-Condillac 
thought experiment, these thinkers conceived of pre-linguistic humans as identical to modern 
humans in terms of their cognitive and social characteristics. Hence, the identification of 
pantomime as the form of communication used by pre-linguistic people is tantamount to the 
statement that pantomime is a natural form of human expression. “Natural” means here that it 
does not depend on learning but appears, to use Condillac’s phrase, “by instinct alone”. 
Although naturalistic glottogeny relied mainly on speculation, it did appeal to the 
empirical evidence that was available at the time, including the evidence afforded by the 
rehabilitation of feral children and by the early work on sign language. Regarding the former 
line of evidence, there were two well studied cases – of Peter the Wild Boy (c. 1711–1785) 
described by Monboddo (1774), and Victor of Aveyron (c. 1788–1828) rehabilitated by Itard 
(1802). They were often seen as supporting the thesis about naturalness of pantomimic 
communication: both Adam and Peter were adept at using full body and gestural 
communication, but even with intensive and planned training they had failed to learn spoken 
language (Żywiczyński, 2018). Similarly, successful attempts to design sign languages based 
on deaf communicators’ own communicative movements were interpreted in this way. The 
strongest claim was made by Pierre Laromiguiére, a student of Condillac’s, who considering 
sign languages and reports on how European travelers communicate with newly discovered 
populations, concluded that pantomimic communication was innate to humans: 
 
The knowledgeable and the ignorant, everyone understands it, everyone speaks it. Let 
one of us be transported to the extremities of the globe in the midst of a horde of 
savages. Do you think that he will not be able to express the most pressing needs of 
life? Do you think he can mistake the signs of a barbarous refusal or the sign of a 
generous and compassionate intention? Therefore, there is no question of inventing a 
language: it already exists made for us by nature. (1826, III, 113; as quoted in 
Knowlson, 1965, p. 507) 
This conclusion led him to a postulate that a universal language should be based on this innate 
capacity to communicate by means of body movements.  
 With the end of the Enlightenment, naturalistic glottogeny subsided, but the idea that 
pantomime constitutes a natural form of human expression lived on. Exemplary here is 
Edward Tylor’s conception of natural language (1881). Using the familiar lines of evidence – 
sign languages and feral cases – complemented with anthropological data, he argues that 
pantomimes and emotive cries constitute a natural system of communication, because these 
two semiotic resources rely on natural signs, i.e. there is an evident connection between the 
form and the referent (Tylor, 1881; Mocerino, 2016, p. 74). In the case of pantomime, this 
evident connection consists in the iconic similarity between pantomimic movements and 
objects, actions or – most commonly – whole events4 they stand for. 
 What does historical language origins research tell us about pantomimic scenarios? 
Abstracting away from the specific lines of evidence described above, they are all based on 
the observation that pantomime is used by humans when, for a variety of reasons, they cannot 
use language for communication. It is this element that makes pantomime-first such an 
attractive proposal. A modern incarnation of this view is found in the tradition of 
                                                 
4 The holistic nature of pantomime makes it a good means of communicating events and by the same token leads 
to the underspecification of individual event components such as agents, patients or actions (see e.g. Zlatev et al., 
2017).  
 
experimental semiotics, which studies the emergence of novel communication systems in the 
laboratory (for an overview see Galantucci, 2017). Many of these studies use "silent gesture", 
i.e. silent, iconic depictions of individual concepts by means of one's hands and arms; e.g. Fay 
et al., 2013; Schouwstra & de Swart, 2014. The strong position experimental semiotics has 
acquired in the science of language evolution intensifies the discussion about pantomime and 
gesture as a potential starting point of language (see e.g. Roberts, Lewandowski, & 
Galantucci, 2015). It should be noted that for both the traditional and modern semiotic-
experimental lines of evidence supporting the pantomimic origin of language, the departure 
point are the socio-cognitive endowments of contemporary people. Hence such arguments can 
only explain processes whereby pantomime culturally evolves into symbolic communication, 
but they do not shed light on how we came to possess these endowments (see below for 
Abib’s scenario). 
Pantomime in Language Origins: Contemporary Accounts 
In current language evolution research, the importance of pantomime is revived in two 
highly influential accounts of language origins: by Michael Arbib and by Michael Tomasello. 
Arbib’s successively updated Mirror System Hypothesis (MSH – Arbib, 2005, 2012, 2016; 
Arbib et al., 2018)5 deserves particular attention: not just for serving as a blueprint for 
pantomimic theories, but also for being perhaps the most complete and mature language 
origins scenario. MSH assigns a separate stage for pantomime, where it arises from 
communicative use of intransitive manual action and later develops into conventionalized 
signs. Tomasello (2008) proposes that the emergence of the language faculty was 
bootstrapped by two types of “natural human gesture”, used to direct attention (pointing) and 
to direct imagination (pantomime), and although pointing receives the primary focus, 
pantomime remains an essential complement. An important third group are bodily-mimetic 
                                                 
5 “However, MSH is not a fixed dogma but, rather, an evolving system to be updated as new data and theory 
become available” (Arbib, 2018a, pp. 131–132). 
 
accounts of language origins by Merlin Donald (1991, 2001) and Jordan Zlatev (2008), whose 
reliance on primarily visual, whole body expression makes them de facto pantomimic (even if 
the word “pantomime” is rarely used there, except in Zlatev et al., 2017). The recent 
pantomimic proposals by Gärdenfors (2017) and Ferretti et al. (2017) are indebted to the 
mimesis theory. 
Arbib: The Mirror System Hypothesis (MSH) 
Definition. Pantomime is a vital element in Michael Arbib’s (2012, 2016) Mirror 
System Hypothesis – a complex model of transition to language from the “baseline” of LCA-
m, the human Last Common Ancestor with monkeys, and LCA-c (with chimpanzees). Does 
pantomime play a sufficiently robust role for MSH to be a truly pantomimic rather than a 
gestural theory? Arbib’s account lacks a thorough and systematic terminological discussion in 
this point. Because of the neuroscientific profile of MSH and the fact that it builds on the 
action of grasping and other mostly6 manual praxic actions, pantomime starts “lean” and 
“manual”, as intransitive execution of a normally mono- or di-transitive action, such as 
reaching for a tool. This may lead to blurring the distinction between pantomime and gesture. 
However, Arbib’s definitions and examples suggest that the word “pantomime” is intended in 
a meaning close to its intuitive sense. Arbib describes pantomime as “the ability to use 
reduced forms of actions to convey aspects of other actions, objects, emotions, or feelings—
the artless sketching of an action to indicate either the action itself or something associated 
with it” (Arbib, 2012, p. 177). Pantomime “involves expressing a situation, object, action, 
character, or emotion without words, and using only gestures, especially imitative gestures, 
and other movements” (2012, p. 217). This is further clarified through examples, including 
the frequently used example of flapping one’s arms to signify a bird or flying. It appears that 
                                                 
6 But not exclusively - so e.g. orofacial praxic and communicative actions are also considered, e.g. Arbib, 2012, 
p. 127. 
 
“pantomime” is a broad concept for Arbib, which includes iconic gestures but transcends this 
category in theoretically consequential ways. 
The Mirror System Hypothesis (MSH). MSH holds a particular significance for 
language origins research, not by being any less controversial than its alternatives, but through 
its remarkable theoretical completeness and the wide range of interdisciplinary data on which 
it is based. MSH proposes that language arose in a series of stages via biocultural evolution: 
first primarily biological, through which the human “language-ready brain” developed on top 
of the primate mirror neuron system for action recognition and imitation; then mostly cultural 




Stages of the development of language in Michael Arbib’s Mirror System Hypothesis (based 
on Arbib, 2005, 2012, 2016). LCA-m, LCA-c = human Last Common Ancestor with monkeys, 
and with chimpanzees. 
1. Mirror Neuron System for grasping and manual praxic actions (LCA-m) 
2. Simple imitation (LCA-c) 
3. CAR&IM: Complex action recognition and complex imitation 
+ communicative intentions, “symbolization”, cultural innovation (possibly latent in 
LCA-c) => 
4. Pantomime 
a) of grasping and manual praxic actions, then => 
b) of actions outside of own repertoire 
=> conventionalization => 
5. Conventional gestures  
 
a) to enrich and disambiguate pantomime 
b) to replace pantomime (protosign) 
6. Protospeech and multimodal holistic protolanguage 
--> fractionation, grammaticalization --> 
7. Full human languages (spoken and signed) 
The foundation for pantomime: CAR&IM. The first of these stages (see Table 1) 
was the extension of simple imitation already present in LCA-c (as inferred from its presence 
in extant apes) into complex action recognition and complex imitation. Whereas simple 
imitation just makes it possible to repeat an established motor routine or else employ trial and 
error to achieve one observed sub-goal from another (Byrne, 2003), complex imitation 
augments this by the ability to imitate aspects of observed movements even if they are not 
part of the imitator’s current stock of actions, thus introducing new variants of actions to 
one’s own repertoire, or “praxicon”. Complex action recognition/imitation has its roots and 
immediate application in praxis, but provides sufficient neuro-motor basis for pantomime. 
Arbib (2012, 2016) names two additional cognitive conditions for such an extension from 
praxis to communication - symbolization (in a loose sense of learning novel sign-meaning 
associations) and communicative intentions7- but claims they are present in the LCA-c at least 
in a rudimentary form. A final likely requirement is “cultural innovation that supports both 
the creation of novel pantomimes <on the fly,> and the ability to recognize that a novel 
behavior is indeed an attempt to communicate” (Arbib, 2018). 
Creative open-endedness. For Arbib, the watershed of pantomime is open-ended 
semantics: “a breakthrough at the level of the freedom to create novel associations” (2012, p. 
261). Following Stokoe and others, Arbib (2012, p. 219) notes that pantomime has “the ability 
                                                 
7 Communicative intentions and more broadly, the motivation to send and receive signals are often taken for 
granted, including in MSH. However, under standard circumstances such intentions and motivations will make 
organisms less rather than more evolutionarily successful (e.g. Wacewicz & Żywiczyński, 2018), and so their 
evolutionary appearance is a “central puzzle” in language evolution research (cf. Fitch, 2010). 
 
to create an open-ended set of complex messages exploiting the primates’ open-ended manual 
dexterity”, thus extending the relatively closed repertoire of ape gestures to a potentially 
unlimited repertoire of pantomimic meanings. The potential to flexibly introduce novel 
signals for novel messages is closely related to other gains in expressive power, i.e. semantic 
universality and displacement. Pantomime is relatively universal in that it can communicate 
about many semantic domains (rather than being restricted to e.g. only predator evasion or 
food), and it can certainly express displaced meanings, i.e. about entities not present in the 
immediate here and now. “Pantomime, then, allows the transfer of a wide range of action 
behaviors to communication about action and much more—whereby, for example, an absent 
object is indicated by outlining its shape or miming its use” (Arbib, 2012, p. 177). 
However, pantomimic communication has considerable drawbacks. Without the 
normative aspect that comes with conventions, pantomimes are spontaneous and impromptu. 
Arbib (e.g. 2012, 2013) repeatedly makes this point by stressing that first pantomimes are “ad 
hoc”, “artless” or “naïve”. Their one-off, unstandardized nature implies that signs must be 
coined on the spot and interpreted on the spot, rather than simply retrieved from memory, so 
the creation and comprehension of these basic units take place in the real-time dynamics of 
the communicative situation. This implies rather substantial costs in terms of time, cognitive 
effort, communicative effectiveness, and replication fidelity. Such inefficiency motivates the 
appearance of conventional gestures, first as additions that enrich and disambiguate the 
pantomimic repertoire but later as more efficient replacements for pantomimes (Arbib, 2012, 
p. 226). Through conventionalization, the next transition is achieved: from pantomime to 
protosign. 
Conventionalization. Conventionalization (also symbolization, Sulik, 2018) is the 
process through which rich iconic signs (gestural, pictorial, or otherwise) are transformed in 
the course of interaction into conventional signs. Iconic signs are based on resemblance, so 
 
their meanings can be guessed from their form through creative inference, but the meanings of 
conventional signs are fixed to particular forms on the strength of a tacit or explicit 
agreement, and can be simply retrieved from memory without any need for guessing. Such 
signs typically, but not necessarily, lose much or sometimes all iconicity in the process and 
are streamlined into forms that are simpler, standardized and much easier to produce. Like 
many other authors (e.g. Hutto, 2008; Corballis, 2014a), Arbib notes that pantomimic/gestural 
forms constitute a perfect substrate for conventionalization, while the inefficiency of 
pantomime, already mentioned above, provides the motivation. “Pantomime can be both 
laborious and highly ambiguous, and so the next step is the conventionalization of 
pantomimes and the addition of otherwise arbitrary gestures to yield a system (protosign) that 
provided economical and less ambiguous symbols” (Arbib, 2016, p. 13). 
 Conventionalization is where the pantomimic scenarios have a clear advantage over 
their competition. Human languages critically depend on semiotic conventions (e.g. de 
Saussure, 1916), and since these are absent from other animal systems of communication, 
their origin is a key explanatory target in language evolution research. A major strength of the 
pantomimic scenarios is that the path to language via pantomime and its subsequent 
conventionalization provides a solution to this problem that is much more compelling than in 
any alternative theories.  
Equally important and valuable here is the evidential basis, because the 
conventionalization of iconic signs is one of the few areas in language evolution research 
where direct empirical evidence exists. There are two principal lines of this evidence – the 
study of emerging sign languages and experimental semiotic research. Regarding the first of 
these there is ample of evidence that proto-signs of an emerging sign language are motivated, 
communicatively complex, and often involve more than just the hands and arms. As a result, 
communication during this proto-phase is slow, laboured and abounds in redundancy. The 
 
existence of this initial stage is confirmed by both historical reports, for example Cucurron 
Sicard’s treaty on the development of the French sign language, and contemporary ones – on 
the development of the Nicaraguan and Al-Sayyid Bedouin Sign Languages (Senghas et al., 
2005; Sandler, Meir, Padden, & Aronoff, 2005; see also Klima & Bellugi, 1979 and Kendon, 
2004, p. 309). This initial stage does not last long: emerging signs quickly become reduced in 
form, and they gradually lose their iconicity, acquiring instead linguistic properties such as 
morphological structure. The strong pressure for conventionalization of iconic forms is also 
documented by experimental semiotic studies. Research on the emergence of novel 
communication systems in the laboratory (Roberts et al., 2015; Scott-Phillips & Kirby, 2010), 
including with improvized “silent gesture” (Fay et al., 2013), shows that when such de novo 
representations are set in an interactive context, their form becomes increasingly economic, 
and the motivated connection between their form and meaning quickly gives way to fixed, 
conventional forms (including gestural conventions, e.g. Motamedi, Schouwstra, Culbertson, 
Smith, & Kirby, 2017). 
Parity and the neural grounding. Pantomime is perhaps the most central step in the 
entire succession of stages, because it serves to complete several key transitions, including the 
abovementioned emergence of open-endedness and then conventionality. But equally 
important to Arbib is the transition from practical to communicative action on the level of 
neuronal mechanisms. As we know from the work on mirror neurons (e.g. Rizzolatti & Arbib, 
1998), the Mirror Neuron System in the primate brain is activated when the primate performs 
an action such as grasping, but also when it sees a similar action performed by another. Arbib 
(e.g. 2005, 2012) observes that this ability to “translate” between production and 
comprehension is also a fundamental requirement in communication: the so-called parity 
principle, whereby the same signal counts for more or less the same meaning to both the 
producer and the receiver of this signal. Arbib’s MSH thus substantially adds to other 
 
pantomimic/gestural models in that it provides a “neural missing link” from the primate 
manual/bodily dexterity to prelinguistic communication with pantomimes and gestures (see 
esp. Arbib, 2016, 2018a for more details on the cerebral implementation). 
Tomasello: Pointing and Pantomiming 
Pantomime and pointing. The element of pantomime is central to Michael 
Tomasello’s (2008) model of language emergence. However, commentators tend to highlight 
the other key features of his account, such as prosociality and shared intentionality, or 
otherwise label Tomasello’s model as ‘gestural’. This is understandable given that 
Tomasello’s very extensive empirical evidence, gathered from both comparative and 
developmental (i.e. humans – other apes; human children – adults) studies, mostly relates to 
pointing. Tomasello proposes declarative pointing, and especially informative-declarative 
pointing (i.e. pointing performed with the intention of providing the recipient with new 
information) to be the first step distinguishing human ancestors from the generalized LCA-a 
baseline. 
However, pantomime as such also has an important role to play. Tomasello (2008) 
uses this term in a way that is rather loose but nonetheless corresponds quite closely to the 
everyday, intuitive meaning: 
The second type of human gesture used as a complete communicative act is iconic 
gestures or pantomimes (depictive, imagistic, characterizing, representational, and 
symbolic gestures are other terms that have been used) … In using an iconic gesture 
the communicator enacts some action with her hands and/or body…, and this is 
intended to induce the recipient to imagine some corresponding perceptually absent 
referent…, for example, an action the communicator wants the recipient to perform or 
an object he wants her to fetch. (p. 66) 
 
This definition and its extensions, as well as his examples (such as miming the grating of 
cheese on pasta, or the use of a chainsaw; Tomasello, 2008, pp. 67, 68) clearly indicate that a 
“rich” interpretation of pantomime is intended. Tomasello’s pantomimes are semantically 
advanced communicative acts, in which the communicator uses the whole body (rather than 
just the upper limbs) to deliver holistic messages with substantial expressive power. 
Action-oriented, standalone, displaced. Characteristically, Tomasello uses the 
gerund form, “pantomiming”, preferentially to the noun “pantomime”. This is because on his 
account, pantomiming is action-oriented and dynamic, and it is employed “(i) to indicate that 
this is the action I want you to perform, or that I intend to perform myself, or that I want to 
tell you about; and (ii) to request or otherwise indicate an object that “does this” or an object 
that “one does this with” (Tomasello, 2008, p. 67). Thus, pantomimes do not seem to have 
internal morphological structures analysable into discrete component parts; rather, 
pantomiming is a continuous holistic process. Similarly, pantomimes themselves are not 
replacements for words, but correspond to larger units, at least proposition-size. Words can 
only complete communicative acts via being combined with other words, but pantomimes are 
“standalone”, in that a single act of pantomiming can serve as a complete communicative act 
with its own illocutionary force. 
 For Tomasello, the special importance of pantomime, and the breakthrough that it 
accomplishes, appears to be displacement, i.e. communication beyond the immediate here-
and-now (Hockett, 1960). In fact, enabling displacement makes pantomime the next logical 
step after pointing. Although pointing is the foundation of human declarative communication, 
its use is typically limited to situations where the intended referents are perceptually available 
and salient. Pantomimes, being much more referentially specific, are not subject to similar 
constraints: “I can only point and intend to indicate a rabbit that is not currently perceptible in 
 
very special circumstances, but I can pantomime an absent rabbit with the same intention 
quite easily” (Tomasello, 2008, p. 233). 
Socio-cognitively complex. Despite numerous references to the “naturalness” of 
pantomime (e.g. 2008, pp. 59, 172), Tomasello recognizes that pantomimic communication 
only becomes possible when embedded in a rich set of nontrivial socio-cognitive capacities. 
Firstly, understanding pantomimes presents a difficulty even to contemporary humans, and 
the property of displacement in particular makes pantomimes even more challenging: “they 
depend, in a way that pointing does not, on skills involving some kind of imitation, 
simulation, or symbolizing” (Tomasello, 2008, p. 67). The advanced cognitive-inferential 
processes required to comprehend pantomimes critically rely on sufficient common ground - a 
framework of knowledge, attentional states, background assumptions, etc. that transcend the 
egocentric perspective and are shared between the communicators (Tomasello, 2008, pp. 73–
88). Even more importantly, pantomimic communication presupposes certain uniquely human 
social predispositions, such as a natural tendency to cooperatively share honest information 
with non-relatives (Tomasello, 2008, pp. 85–97). Since cooperative signaling is evolutionarily 
anomalous and is indeed very rare in animal communication, the human propensity to 
communicate cooperatively can by no means be taken for granted. Nonetheless, the major 
explanatory challenge that it poses is equally relevant to all theories of language origins, 
pantomimic or otherwise (cf. Wacewicz & Żywiczyński, 2018).  
Donald and Zlatev: Mimesis 
Merlin Donald. A very influential position on the evolution of early, protolinguistic 
capabilities was formulated by Donald (1991, 2001), and developed by other researchers 
(most notably Zlatev, 2008, 2014; Zlatev et al., 2017; but see also Gärdenfors, 2017 and 
Żywiczyński et al., 2018). Donald's proposal was part of his theory of human cognitive and 
cultural evolution that suggests three stages going from episodic to mimetic to mythic culture. 
 
Episodic culture is characteristic of the life of early hominins and is similar to the behavior of 
non-human apes. Whereas episodic cognitive culture is concerned with the representation of 
concrete situations or episodes (1991, pp. 148–153), mimetic culture breaks with that tradition 
and is facilitated by the emergence of abstract representations, something that Donald posits 
to have occurred with the rise of Homo erectus. The defining component of mimetic skill or 
mimesis is "the ability to produce conscious, self-initiated, representational acts that are 
intentional but not linguistic" (1991, p. 168). In this way, it is the symbolic nature of mimetic 
acts that separate them from even complex forms of imitation (see Arbib above). Donald 
understands mimesis widely as both a cognitive and communicative innovation. It should be 
stressed that mimesis does not necessarily involve social communication, but can be used for 
retrieving a particular memory (i.e. mimetic representations serve as internal cues to aid long-
term memory, 1991, p. 148; see also Donald, 2001) or rehearsing and practicing a skill such 
as boxing drills or dancing steps (1991, p. 172). 
When it comes to mimetic communication, Donald enumerates a variety of semiotic 
resources - "[t]ones of voice, facial expressions, eye movements, manual signs and gestures, 
postural attitudes, patterned whole-body movements of various sorts” (1991, p. 169). He 
further identifies pantomime and ritual dance as purely mimetic means of communication that 
are present in contemporary human cultures. However, speaking generally, mimetic 
communication is any communicative act in which the body is intentionally used to represent 
something (i.e. stand for something other than itself, 1991, pp. 171–173). He also stresses the 
capacity of mimesis to communicate about an unlimited repertoire of referents, most 
importantly events. On such an account, pantomime seems to lie at the heart of Donald's 
mimetic communication. Donald understands mimesis as a precursor to language which 
emerges in the next stage - mythic culture, and his scenario of language evolution can 
therefore be classified as pantomimic.  
 
Jordan Zlatev. Zlatev (2008; Zlatev et al., 2005) developed Donald's mimesis to build 
a detailed account of language emergence. For Zlatev, the evolution of language is seen as the 
evolution of multi-layered socio-cognitive capacities, in which the earlier ones co-exist with 
the later additions (Zlatev, 2008). Zlatev puts focus on definitional problems, particularly with 
respect to the foundational concept of bodily mimesis. Accordingly, an act counts as bodily-
mimetic if it meets the following criteria (Zlatev, 2008): 
(a) It involves a cross-modal mapping between exteroception (i.e. perception of the 
environment, normally dominated by vision) and proprioception (perception of 
one's own body, normally through kinesthetic sense).  
(b) It is under conscious control and corresponds - either iconically or indexically - 
to some action, object or event, while at the same time being differentiated from 
it by the subject. 
(c) The subject intends the act to stand for some action, object or event for an 
addressee (and for the addressee to recognize this intention 
(d) Without the act being conventional-normative.  
(e) Without the act dividing (semi)compositionally into meaningful sub-acts that 
systematically relate to each other and other similar acts. (p. 219) 
He links this definition to what he calls the mimesis hierarchy (Table 2), which is an 
evolutionary sequence of mimetic skills (Zlatev, Persson, & Gärdenfors, 2005; Zlatev, 2008). 
The rudimentary form of mimesis - proto-mimesis - is based on the requirement (a) (see 
above) and is linked to such communicative activities as emotional and attentional contagion 
or automatic type of imitation (e.g. neonatal imitation). The more advanced form of dyadic 
mimesis involves volition and representation, for example present in more complex imitation 
(see the requirement (b) above), but only at the next level, referred to as triadic mimesis, 
mimetic acts gain a decidedly communicative function. As stipulated by the requirement (c), a 
 
triadically mimetic act requires the communicative intention, i.e. that a producer's 
representation is understood as standing "for some action, object or event for an addressee". 
Finally, post-mimesis is explained as the positive versions of the requirements (d) and (e), i.e. 
triadic acts that are characterized by conventionality and normativity (d), and by semiotic 
systematicity (e). The endpoint of post-mimesis is spoken or signed languages. 
 
Table 2 
Zlatev’s mimesis hierarchy 
1. Proto-mimesis: rudimentary form of mimesis involving contagion or automatic form 
imitation; 
2. Dydadic mimesis: volition and representation required for complex imitation; 
3. Triadic mimesis: communicative intentions required for Pantomime; 
4. Post-mimesis: conventionality, normativity and systematicity.  
 
 Crucial for Zlatev's idea of mimetic communication, including pantomime, is the 
requirement (c) and the corresponding notion of triadic mimesis. He enumerates pantomime 
sensu Arbib (2005) and gesture sensu Corballis (2002a) as well as iconic gestures and 
declarative pointing sensu Tomasello (2008; see 4.2 above) as types of triadic mimesis 
(2008). He also illustrates it with what in our definitional framework are prototypical 
examples of pantomime, e.g.: "An example of an iconic sign that fulfils all three conditions 
(a)-(c) is the miming of eating by pretending to move a spoon to one's mouth (e.g. made 
behind a glass door) in order to communicate to a colleague that it is time for lunch" (Zlatev, 
2008, p. 138). Accordingly, pantomime could be defined as an act of bodily communication, 
in which a bodily action is volitionally used to represent something else than the bodily action 
itself, i.e. to stand for an object, action or an event, and in which the addressee understands 
 
this intention. Furthermore, pantomime should be free from semiotic conventions and holistic, 
in the sense that it does not naturally decompose into lower level-units.  
In a recent empirical paper Zlatev (Zlatev et al., 2017) accepts Żywiczyński and 
colleagues' (2018) definitional criteria for pantomime (see 2.2. above) and uses them to 
formulate a pantomime-first scenario of the emergence of language. It hypothesizes that early 
form of mimetic communication, although using a variety of modalities, primarily relied on 
the bodily-visual modality, due to its greater potential for iconic (resemblance-based) 
representations (Zlatev et al., 2017, p. 457). In this way, Zlatev and colleagues differentiate 
the pantomime-first position from what they call the multimodal-first positions, represented 
by McNeill (2012) or Kendon (2014), who stress an early integration and mutual development 
of bodily-visual and vocal-auditory communication. 
Related conceptions. 
Gärdenfors. Gärdenfors focuses on the evolution of pedagogy, particularly in the 
context of tool-making (see Gärdenfors & Högberg, this volume). In doing so, however, he 
looks at a suite of cognitive adaptations that are of great interest to the science of language 
evolution. In his opinion, the core capacities are mind-reading skills and auto-rehearsal. Mind-
reading abilities (Premack & Woodruff, 1978) include what Gärdenfors calls "cooperative 
forms of mind reading" – joint attention and joint intention (cf. Tomasello, 2008). In 
explaining auto-rehearsal, he appeals to Donald's mimesis theory (see above) and underlines 
the role of recall of previous performance for both learning complex activities (such as tool 
making) and teaching them to others (which is linked to Sterelny's notion of the 
apprenticeship culture, Sterelny, 2012b; see also Stout, 2018). An analysis of early stone-tool 
cultures leads him to conclude that beginning with the Oldowan toolkit, teaching became 
necessary to effectively transmit the technology to other individuals and to maintain it in a 
population (Gärdenfors & Högberg, 2017). The principal forms of teaching that this 
 
transmission process relied on were two types of enactment – demonstration and pantomime. 
For pantomime, he specifies the following criteria (Gärdenfors, 2017): 
(P1) The mimer performs the movements of the actions in the task without 
actually performing the actions. 
(P2) The mimer makes sure that the learner attends to the series of actions. 
(P3) The mimer's intention is that the learner can perceive the right actions in 
the correct sequence. 
(P4) The mimer exaggerates and slows down some of the actions in order to 
facilitate for the learner to perceive important features.8 
The notable difference between pantomime and demonstration concerns the first point 
- whereas in demonstration the teacher actually performs the actions involved in the task (e.g. 
actually knaps a stone), in pantomime the teacher pretends to perform the actions 
("Pantomime is a form of pretense", Gärdenfors, 2017), by using "more or less simplified 
versions of them" (pretends to knap a stone, Gärdenfors, 2017). Contexts, other than teaching, 
in which pantomime is used include narration and autocued rehearsal, e.g. practicing stone 
knapping actions without performing the activity of stone knapping (see above, 2.4). 
What is the connection between pantomime used for teaching and the hypothetical role 
pantomime could have played in the emergence of language? Gärdenfors links the history of 
pantomime to the evolution of mimesis. Using Zlatev's mimesis hierarchy, he describes 
pantomime as belonging to the third, triadic level of mimesis, i.e. such that has 
communicative sign function (Gärdenfors, 2017; Zlatev et al., 2005). In consonance with 
Arbib (2012), Żywiczyński et al. (2018) and Zlatev et al. (2017), Gärdenfors (2017) argues 
that pantomime was a precursor of language, used to refer to events as pantomimically 
                                                 
8 In line with Stout (e.g. 2018), it could be argued that active teaching of this sort constitutes “structured and 
meaningful community of practice”, whereby learners are not just equipped with specific information but also 
with the motivation to learn specific things in specific ways.   
 
represented holophrases (i.e. signs having the form of unanalyzed expressions; see 2.2) that 
were later broken down into smaller semantic elements. Notably, the pedagogical use of 
pantomime as demonstration starts “lean”, from communication of procedural “knowledge-
how” information, but has a potential to scale up to richer uses, i.e. communicating semantic-
propositional information, or “knowledge-that”.  
Other accounts. Ferretti et al. (2017; see also Ferretti, this volume) mention 
pantomime in the context of their narrative account of language origins. Following Corballis, 
they identify Mental Time Travel (MTT) as the cognitive mechanism indispensable to global 
coherence, which - on their view - allows for the production and comprehension of narrative 
(Ferretti et al., 2017; Adornetti, 2015). While the emergence of MTT was a cognitive 
precondition for language, the crucial requirement of the narrative account of language 
evolution was the presence of a pre-linguistic communication system that could have been 
used to “tell” stories. Accordingly, they argue that pantomime as defined by Żywiczyński et 
al. (2018) meets the requirements of such a system, stressing its communicative complexity 
and self-sufficiency, which translates into the ability of pantomime to describe whole events 
in the absence of conventional semiotic resources.  
The fact that pantomime is often seen as an important sub-type of the communicative 
manifestation of mimesis makes many of these accounts that stress the role of mimesis in the 
emergence of language interpretable as pantomimic scenarios. Harnad (2000) sees pantomime 
as part of a continuum in language origins: praxis → pantomime → propositions. Hutto 
(2008) underscores the potential social role of pantomime in ceremonies and other group-
specific practices: 
Regular re-enactments of events of special significance may have eventually become 
deeply ingrained in the social fabric, thus supporting the establishment of common 
customs and habits … [becoming] a powerful substitute means of ensuring social 
 
cohesion, supplanting or at least supplementing the physical grooming of individuals 
… [and they] would have helped to solidify within-group identities.” (p. 261) 
Steven Mithen’s Hmmmm proposal (2005) sees language as emergent from the holistic, 
manipulative, multimodal, musical and mimetic mode of communication; and although on his 
account early meaning-making employs a wide polymodal suite of semiotic resources, to the 
extent that visual pantomimic displays have a key role in this mix, Mithen’s scenario can be 
classified as a broadly pantomimic scenario. These last accounts underscore the continuity 
between pantomime and other manifestations of mimesis, such as ritual, dance and music. 
This continuity is exemplified in some cultural practices found in contemporary hunter-
gatherer tribes (e.g. Lewis, 2013). 
Finally, we note the recent account by Brown et al. (2019), which stands out by 
distinguishing several subtypes, or modes, of pantomime. Brown et al. (2019) identify two 
main such modes: egocentric pantomiming that refers to one’s own peripersonal space 
(similar to “character viewpoint”) and allocentric pantomiming about referents in objective 
space, as experienced by an external observer (similar to “observer viewpoint”). Brown et al. 
link the relative advantages of the egocentric mode to a People-First model of language 
origins, which prioritizes communication about humans, and the advantages of the allocentric 
mode to an Environment-First model, i.e. communication about the ecological environment. 
Criticisms 
The criticisms directly targeting pantomimic conceptions of language origins 
(Abramova, 2018) or indirectly relevant to them (e.g. Cartmill & Goldin-Meadow, 2012) can 
be divided into two broad groups. Firstly, pantomime is a mostly visual means of 
communication, which leaves unexplained the dominant role of vocal-auditory channel in the 
languages of today (sign language and co-speech gesture notwithstanding, see Goldin-
Meadow, this volume). Secondly, critics take issue with the iconic grounding of meaning in 
 
pantomime, suggesting in particular that despite claims about intuitiveness and “naturalness”, 
iconicity is cognitively complex. 
The Transition to Language 
Modality shift. All theories postulating a non-vocal stage in language emergence face 
a fundamental difficulty: If language arose as a (predominantly) gestural/visual system, why 
would it now have the (predominantly) spoken/vocal form that it does – and how can we 
explain the extensive anatomical and neuroanatomical human adaptations to speech 
production? This is the so-called “modality switch” or “modality transition” problem which is 
commonly identified as the most difficult challenge for gesture-first theories (e.g. Burling, 
2005; Corballis, 2003; Kendon, 2008; MacNeilage, 2008; Tallerman, 2011).  
Other commentators (e.g. Bickerton, 2007) see this problem as ill-posed, because it 
relies on a framing of the gesture-speech dichotomy that is unrealistically exclusionary (see 
Kendon, 2011; Wacewicz, Żywiczyński, & Orzechowski, 2016). For example, even the 
supporters of gesture-first theories do not shy away from admitting that “there never was a 
time when visible gestures were unaccompanied by vocalizations” (Armstrong & Wilcox, 
2007, p. 68). To what degree gestural and pantomimic theories are affected by this difficulty 
depends on the division of labour between vocal and visual expression postulated by a 
particular theory, with the pantomimic accounts based on multimodal mimesis being 
relatively less vulnerable in this respect: 
In general, the less pre-linguistic gestural communication is thought of as a 
“language”, and the less modern spoken languages are conceived of as purely vocal, 
the less problematic the why-speech argument appears. While it is indeed damaging 
for scenarios that frame the transition as one “from hand to mouth” (Corballis, 2002), 
they are not if stated in the much less idiomatic “from body to mouth-and-body” 
(Zlatev, Donald, & Sonesson, 2010). That is, from whole-body communication 
 
supported by the human-specific capacity for bodily mimesis to the multi-modal 
system of linguistic communication which we use today, involving both speech and 
gesture. (Zlatev, 2014, p. 174; see also 2.1.2) 
Pantomime “repels” language. This type of criticism, influentially advocated by 
McNeill (2012), stresses that pantomime, unlike gesticulation, is separated from modern 
language use. McNeill’s attack on the view that pantomime could have constituted a precursor 
of language is motivated by both his definition of pantomime and his scenario of language 
emergence. McNeill’s influential Growth-Point theory assumes that language relies on the 
single dialectical unit consisting of gesture and speech. The supposition of the steadfast 
connection between these two types of communicative actions leads McNeill (2012) to the 
claim that since its dawn language has made use of both the bodily-visual and vocal-auditory 
modalities.  
When attacking the pantomimic scenarios of language origin, McNeill (2013) in fact 
attacks the gesture-first theories, which accords with his definition of pantomime as gestures 
necessarily performed in the absence of speech. The argument runs as follows: given the co-
expressiveness of gestures and speech in contemporary language use, positing that language 
could have evolved from gesture alone (i.e. pantomime in his dictum) is an evolutionary 
fiction. Without delving into the problem of the correctness of McNeill’s evolutionary logic 
(e.g. discarding the possibility that at the early, bootstrapping stage, the emerging 
protolanguage could have been very different from contemporary fully fledged language), this 
bears on McNeill’s conception of pantomime, which for him cannot just be accompanied by 
speech but in fact cannot be accompanied by any vocalization – pantomime turns out to rely 
on a single semiotic resource of gesturing. A broader understanding of pantomime as 
including a variety of semiotic resources, as accepted by e.g. Zlatev et al. (2017), would 
therefore blunt McNeill’s critique. 
 
Iconicity 
Some criticisms of pantomimic scenarios target the element that has often been 
championed by their proponents – pantomime’s robust iconicity, which is commonly 
appealed to when explaining the ease with which pantomime takes communication off the 
ground (e.g. Arbib, 2012; Zlatev et al., 2017; Gärdenfors, 2017). For example, Irvine (2016) 
notes that iconicity can be communicatively disadvantageous: successful communication 
requires that participants have sufficient psychological distance from the representations they 
use, and iconic visual presentations may be too vivid and rich in detail, making it more 
difficult to decontextualize them and achieve that psychological distance. Empirical results 
are equivocal. Some authors (e.g. Imai & Kita, 2014) show iconicity to be helpful in the 
ontogenetic acquisition of lexical representations, whereas others (Cartmill, 2018) remain 
sceptical of generalizing such results to phylogeny, or conclude that reviews of developmental 
research in humans and of behavioural and neuroscientific research in non-human primates 
fail to document a clear facilitating role for iconicity in understanding representations (Irvine, 
2016; Cartmill & Goldin-Meadow, 2012, pp. 418–419). More research is certainly needed to 
adjudicate on this point. 
Abramova (2018) argues that iconicity required by pantomime is cognitively 
demanding, which burdens pantomimic theories with unexplained assumptions. She notes that 
Arbib’s (2012) account assumes symbolization and Gricean communicative intentions as 
necessary elements of the cognitive infrastructure for pantomime, but these features are absent 
from non-human primate cognition and communication, and are themselves major 
explanatory targets. Arbib (2018b) responds that firstly, these features seem to be present to 
some extent in primate gesture, and secondly, there appear to be no convincing leaner 
explanations. In general, Arbib, Tomasello, Donald, Zlatev or Gärdenfors all do take the point 
 
that the emergence of pantomime required a socio-cognitive breakthrough in hominin 
evolution. 
Finally, the expressive power of resemblance-based representations has been 
questioned. Pantomimic theories of language origins are committed to a “rich” definition of 
pantomime, since its role as a pivotal step in language emergence would seem to imply it to 
be an advanced means of communication. This in turn would imply considerable expressive 
power, such as the ability to communicate a potentially unlimited repertoire of events, or 
sequences of events, not limited to the here and now or to a confined number of semantic 
domains. It has been suggested that pantomime is not self-sufficient in this respect, and 
cannot express certain abstract meanings, except with the aid of other semiotic resources, such 
as disambiguating verbal clues (Ryan, 2012; see also Cartmill, 2018; but see Sibierska, 2017 
for an argument to the contrary). A possible reply to this objection is that at least initially 
pantomime does not necessarily need to have large expressive power, as long as it can support 
the breakthrough to open-ended semantics. The limits to the expressive potential of stand-
alone pantomime remain an interesting empirical question. 
Summary and Conclusion 
Similarly to gestural theories of language emergence, pantomimic accounts propose 
that language arose primarily, if not exclusively, out of visually perceived communicative 
action. This is their main strength: on the one hand, the natural iconicity of visual displays 
allows the interactants to invent novel signs whose meanings can be guessed without prior 
knowledge, and on the other, considerable evidence suggests pantomimes are a good substrate 
for conventionalization, which can turn them into symbols. Pantomimic and gestural theories 
of language origins indeed form a continuum and the need to separate them may not be 
obvious, but we show that such a distinction is theoretically productive. Firstly, while the term 
“gesture” is broad and ambiguous, “pantomime” (and so “pantomime-first theories”) is more 
 
specific and informative: it is bodily-mimetic communication which is non-conventional, 
improvised, whole-body rather than manual-only, holistic, and communicatively and 
semantically complex. Secondly, gesture-first scenarios tend to focus on the hands and arms, 
whereas pantomime-first theories stress the importance of whole-body communicative action. 
Thirdly, most mimetic theories heavily rely on pantomime and although classifying them as 
“gestural” would be rather odd, they comfortably belong within the spectrum of pantomimic 
theories. 
 Among the most critical defining features of language are open-endedness, 
displacement, and conventionality. Pantomime enables the first two features (4.1.4, 4.2.2) and 
provides a credible entry point for bootstrapping the third: a “bridge” from icons to 
communicative conventions (4.1.5). Two more bridges are a “neural missing link” from 
practical action to pantomimic communication via the primate Mirror Neuron System (4.1.6), 
and the bootstrapping of the cognitively richer propositional communication with the 
cognitively leaner demonstration of motor routines (4.3.3.1). 
 Like all language origins theories, pantomimic models make background assumptions 
about the socio-cognitive infrastructure of our prelinguistic ancestors, and these assumptions 
can be questioned (e.g. Abramova, 2018). Arbib (e.g. 2012) provides a comprehensive 
account of the neurocognitive mechanisms involved in the transition from simple imitation to 
communication via pantomime, but his model takes for granted some social requirements for 
informative communication, such as common ground or cooperative dispositions. 
Tomasello’s (2008) account, not as detailed on the specifics of implementation, provides a 
much more complete discussion of these social requirements. As of now, the discussions 
remain mostly theoretical, since with rare exceptions (Zlatev et al., 2017; Brown et al., 2019) 




Acknowledgements: This research was supported by grant UMO-2017/27/B/HS2/00642 
from the Polish National Science Centre. We are grateful to the editors of this volume, 
Nathalie Gontier and Christopher Sinha, as well as to Michael Arbib, for valuable and 
insightful comments. We thank Karolina Nowicka for her help in editing. All remaining errors 
and omissions are our own.  
 
References 
Abramova, E. (2018). The role of pantomime in gestural language evolution, its cognitive 
bases and an alternative. Journal of Language Evolution, 3(1), 26–40. 
Adornetti, I. (2015). The phylogenetic foundations of discourse coherence: A pragmatic 
account of the evolution of language. Biosemiotics, 8(3), 421–441. 
Arbib, M. A. (2005). From monkey-like action recognition to human language: An 
evolutionary framework for neurolinguistics. Behavior and Brain Sciences, 28, 105–
167. 
Arbib, M. A. (2012). How the brain got language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Arbib, M. A. (2013). Complex imitation and the language-ready brain. Language and 
Cognition, 5(2–3), 273–312. 
Arbib, M. A. (2016). Towards a computational comparative neuroprimatology: Framing the 
language-ready brain. Physics of Life Reviews, 16, 1–54. 
Arbib, M. A. (2018a). From cybernetics to brain theory, and more: A memoir. Cognitive 
Systems Research, 50, 83–145. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2018.04.001 
Arbib, M. A. (2018b). In support of the role of pantomime in language evolution. Journal of 
Language Evolution, 3(1), 41–44. https://doi.org/10.1093/jole/lzx023 
Arbib, M. A., Aboitiz, F., Burkart, J. M., Corballis, M., Coudé, G., Hech, E., … Wilson, B. 
(2018). The comparative neuroprimatology 2018 (CNP-2018): Road map for research 
on How the brain got language. Interaction Studies, 19(1–2), 370–387. 
Armstrong, D. F., & Wilcox, S. E. (2007). The gestural origin of language. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Armstrong, D. F., Stokoe, W. C., & Wilcox, S. E.  (1995). Gesture and the nature of 
language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bickerton, D. (2007). Language evolution: A brief guide for linguists. Lingua, 117, 510–526. 
 
Brown, S., Mittermaier, E., Kher, T., & Arnold, P. (2019). How pantomime works: 
Implications for theories of language origin. Frontiers in Communication, 4, 9. 
Burling, R. (2005). The talking ape: How language evolved. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Byrne, R. W. (2003). Imitation as behaviour parsing. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci, 
358(1431), 529–536. doi:10.1098/rstb.2002.1219 
Calvin, W. H., & Bickerton, D. (2000). Lingua ex machina: Reconciling Darwin and 
Chomsky with the human brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Cartmill, E. A. (2018). Iconicity and convention in the manual modality: Pantomime in 
language origins. In C. Cuskley et al. (Eds.), The evolution of language: Proceedings 
of the 12th International Conference on the Evolution of Language (Evolang12) (pp. 
73–75). Torun: NCU Press. doi: 10.12775/3991-1.014 
Cartmill, E. A., & Goldin-Meadow, S. (2012). Is pantomime a likely stage in language 
evolution? Evidence from human and primate gesture. In T. C. Scott-Phillips, M. 
Tamariz, E. A. Cartmill, & J. R. Hurford (Eds.), The evolution of language: 
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference (EVOLANG9) (p. 418). Singapore: 
World Scientific. 
Corballis, M. C. (2002a). From hand to mouth: The origins of language. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Corballis, M. C. (2002b). Did language evolve from manual gestures? In A. Wray (Ed.), The 
transition to language (pp. 161–179). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Corballis, M. C. (2003). From mouth to hand: Gesture, speech, and the evolution of right-
handedness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 26(2), 199–208. 
Corballis, M. C. (2013). Gestural theory of the origins of language. In C. Lefebvre, B. 
Comrie, & H. Cohen (Eds.), New perspectives on the origins of language (pp.171–
184). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Corballis, M. C. (2014a). The gradual evolution of language. Humana Mente: Journal of 
Philosophical Studies, 27, 39–60. 
Corballis, M. C. (2014b). The word according to Adam. In M. Seyfeddinipur & M. Gullberg 
(Eds.), From gesture in conversation to visible action as utterance (pp. 177–198). 
Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
de Condillac, É. B. (1756). An essay on the origin of human knowledge (T. Nugent, Trans.). 
London: J. Nourse. (Original work published 1746) 
de Mandeville, B. (1728). The fable of the bees. Part II. London: J. Roberts. 
de Saussure, F. (1959). Course in general linguistics (W. Baskin, Trans.). New York, NY: 
Philosophical Library. (Original work published 1916) 
Donald, M. (1991). Origins of the modern mind: Three stages in the evolution of culture and 
cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
Donald, M. (2001). A mind so rare. The evolution of human consciousness. New York: 
Norton.  
Fay, N., Arbib, M., & Garrod, S. (2013). How to bootstrap a human communication system. 
Cognitive Science, 37(7), 1356–1367. 
Ferretti, F. (this volume). The narrative origins of language. In N. Gontier & C. Sinha (Eds.), 
Handbook of human symbolic evolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Ferretti, F., Adornetti, I., Chiera, A., Nicchiarelli, S., Magni, R., Valeri, G., & Marini, A. 
(2017). Mental Time Travel and language evolution: A narrative account of the origins 
of human communication. Language Sciences, 63, 105-118. 
Fitch, T. (2010). The evolution of language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Fitch, T. (2017). Empirical approaches to the study of language evolution. Psychonomic 
Bulletin & Review, 24(1), 3–33. 
 
Galantucci, B. (2017). Experimental semiotics. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of 
Linguistics. doi: 10.1093/acrefore/9780199384655.013.210 
Gärdenfors, P. (2017). Demonstration and pantomime in the evolution of teaching. Frontiers 
in Psychology, 8, 415. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00415 
Gärdenfors, P., & Högberg, A. (2017). The archaeology of teaching and the evolution of 
Homo docens. Current Anthropology, 58(2), 188–208. doi: 10.1086/691178 
Gärdenfors, P., & Högberg, A. (this volume). In N. Gontier & C. Sinha (Eds.), Handbook of 
human symbolic evolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Goldin-Meadow, S. (this volume). Gesture is an intrinsic part of modern-day human 
communication and may always have been so. In N. Gontier & C. Sinha (Eds.), 
Handbook of human symbolic evolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Goodwin, C. (2017). Co-operative action (Learning in doing: Social, cognitive and 
computational perspectives). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Harnad, S. (2000). From sensorimotor praxis and pantomine to symbolic representations. 
Proceedings of 3rd International Conference on the Evolution of Language. Paris 3–6 
April 2000, 118–125.  
Hewes, G. W. (1977). A model for language evolution. Sign Language Studies, 15, 97–168. 
Hewes, G. W. (1996). A history of the study of language origins and the gestural primacy 
hypothesis. In A. Lock & C. R. Peters (Eds.), Handbook of human symbolic evolution 
(pp. 263–269). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hockett, C. F. (1960). The origin of speech. Scientific American, 203, 88–111. 
Hutto, D. (2008). First communions: Mimetic sharing without theory of mind. In J. Zlatev, T. 
Racine, C. Sinha, & E. Itkonen (Eds.), The shared mind: Perspectives on 
intersubjectivity (pp. 245–276). Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
 
Imai, M., & Kita, S. (2014). The sound symbolism bootstrapping hypothesis for language 
acquisition and language evolution. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 
369(1651), 20130298. 
Irvine, E. (2016). Method and evidence: Gesture and iconicity in the evolution of 
language. Mind & Language, 31(2), 221–247. 
Itard, J. M. G. (1802). An historical account of the discovery and education of a savage man: 
Or, the first developments, physical and moral, of the young savage caught in the 
woods near Aveyron in the year 1798. London: Richard Phillips. 
Kendon, A. (2004). Gesture: Visible action as utterance. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Kendon, A. (2008). Signs for language origins? The Public Journal of Semiotics, 2, 2–29. 
Kendon, A. (2011). Some modern considerations for thinking about language evolution: A 
discussion of The evolution of language by Tecumseh Fitch. The Public Journal of 
Semiotics, 3(1), 79–108. 
Kendon, A. (2014). The ‘poly-modalic' nature of utterances and its relevance for inquiring 
into language origins. In D. Dor, S. Knight, & J. Lewis (Eds.), The social origins of 
language (pp. 67–76). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Klima, E., & Bellugi, U. (1979). The signs of language. Harvard, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Knowlson, J. R. (1965). The idea of gesture as a universal language in the 17th and 18th 
centuries. Journal of the History of Ideas, 26, 495–508. 
Laromiguiére, P. (1826). Leçons de philosophie sur les principes de l'intelligence, ou sur les 
causes et sur les origines des idées. Paris: Brunot-Labbe. 
Lewis, J. (2013). A cross-cultural perspective on the significance of music and dance to 
culture and society insight from BaYaka pygmies. In M. A. Arbib (Ed.), Language, 
 
music, and the brain: A mysterious relationship (pp. 45–65). Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Liebal, K., & Oña, L. (2018). Different approaches to meaning in primate gestural and vocal 
communication. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 478. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00478 
MacNeilage, P. F. (2008). The origin of speech. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
McNeill, D. (2012). How language began: Gesture and speech in human evolution. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
McNeill, D. (2013). The co-evolution of gesture and speech, and downstream consequences. 
In C. Müller et al. (Eds.), Body–language–communication (Vol. 1) (pp.  480–512). 
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 
Mithen, S. (2005). The singing Neanderthals: The origins of music, language, mind and body. 
London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson. 
Mocerino, R. P. (2016). Gesture, interjection and onomatopoeia in Edward Burnett Tylor’s 
theory of the origin and development of language. Theoria et Historia Scientiarum, 13, 
71–84. 
Monboddo (Burnett, J.). (1774). Of the origin and progress of language. Edinburgh-London: 
Balfour, Cadell. 
Motamedi, Y., Schouwstra, M., Culbertson, J., Smith, K., & Kirby, S. (2017). The cultural 
evolution of complex linguistic constructions in artificial sign languages. In 
Proceedings of the 39th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Seattle, 
WA: Cognitive Science Society. 
Müller, C. (2014). Gestural modes of representation as techniques of depiction. In C. Müller 
et al. (Eds.), Body-language-communication: An international handbook on 
multimodality in human interaction (pp. 1687–1702). Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton. 
 
Perlman, M., Dale, R., & Lupyan, G. (2015). Iconicity can ground the creation of vocal 
symbols. Royal Society Open Science, 2(8). doi:10.1098/rsos.150152 
Power, C. (2009). Sexual selection models for the emergence of symbolic communication: 
Why they should be reversed. In R. Botha & C. Knight (Eds.), The cradle of language 
(pp. 257–280). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Rizzolatti, G., & Arbib, M. (1998). Language within our grasp. Trends in Neurosciences, 
21(5), 188–194. 
Roberts, G., Lewandowski, J., & Galantucci, B. (2015). How communication changes when 
we cannot mime the world: Experimental evidence for the effect of iconicity on 
combinatoriality. Cognition, 141, 52–66. 
Russon, A. (2018). Pantomime and imitation in great apes: Implications for reconstructing the 
evolution of language. Interaction Studies, 19(1–2), 200–215. 
Ryan, M.-L. (2012). Narration in various media. In P. Hühn, J. C. Meister, J. Pier, & W. 
Schmid (Eds.), The living handbook of narratology. Retrieved from 
http://www.lhn.uni-hamburg.de/article/narration-various-media 
Sandler, W. (2013). Vive la différence: Sign language and spoken language in language 
evolution. Language and Cognition, 5(2-3), 189-203. 
Sandler, W., Meir, I., Padden, C., & Aronoff, M. (2005). The emergence of grammar: 
Systematic structure in a new language. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America, 102(7), 2661–2665. 
Schouwstra, M., & de Swart, H. (2014). The semantic origins of word order. Cognition, 131, 
431–436. 
Scott-Phillips, T. C., & Kirby, S. (2010). Language evolution in the laboratory. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 14(9), 411–417. 
 
Senghas, R. J., Senghas, A., & Pyers, J. E. (2005). The emergence of Nicaraguan Sign 
Language: Questions of development, acquisition, and evolution. In S. T. Parker, J. 
Langer, & C. Milbrath (Eds.), Biology and knowledge revisited: From neurogenesis to 
psychogenesis (pp. 287–306). London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Sibierska, M. (2017). Storytelling without telling: The non-linguistic nature of narratives from 
evolutionary and narratological perspectives. Language & Communication, 54, 47–55. 
Sonneson, G. (1997). The ecological foundations of iconicity. In I. Rauch, G. Carr, & F. 
Gerald (Eds.), Semiotics Around the World: Synthesis in Diversity (pp. 739–742). 
Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Sterelny, K. (2012a). Language, gesture, skill: The co-evolutionary foundations of language. 
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B, 367(1599), 2141–2151. 
Sterelny, K. (2012b). The evolved apprentice. How evolution made human unique. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Stokoe, W. C. (1991). Semantic phonology. Sign Language Studies, 71, 107–114. 
Stout, D. (2018). Archaeology and the evolutionary neuroscience of language: The 
technological pedagogy hypothesis. Interaction Studies, 19(1–2), 256–271. 
Stout, D., & Chaminade, T. (2012). Stone tools, language and the brain in human evolution. 
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B, 367(1585), 75–87. 
Sulik, J. (2018). Cognitive mechanisms for inferring the meaning of novel signals during 
symbolization. PLoS ONE, 13(1), e0189540. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0189540 
Tallerman, M. (2011). Protolanguage. In K. R. Gibson & M. Tallerman (Eds.), The Oxford 
handbook of language evolution (pp. 479–491). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Tanner, J., & Perlman, M. (2017). Moving beyond ‘meaning’: Gorillas combine gestures into 
sequences for creative display. Language Communication, 54, 56–72. 
 
Tomasello, M. (2008). Origins of human communication. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Tramacere, A., & Moore, R. (2018). Reconsidering the role of manual imitation in language 
evolution. Topoi, 37(2), 319–328. 
Tylor, E. B. (1881). Anthropology: An introduction to the study of man and civilization. 
London: Macmillan & Co. 
Vico, G. (1948). The new science of Giambattista Vico (T. G. Bergin & M. H. Fish, Trans.). 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Original work published 1725) 
Volterra, V., Capirci, O., Rinaldi, P., & Sparaci, L. (2018). From action to spoken and signed 
language through gesture: Some basic issues for a discussion on the evolution of the 
human language-ready brain. Interaction Studies, 19(1–2), 216–238. 
Wacewicz, S., & Żywiczyński, P. (2015). From the narrow to the broad. Multiple perspectives 
on language evolution. Theoria et Historia Scientiarum, 11, 5–18. 
Wacewicz, S., & Żywiczyński, P. (2018). Language origins: Fitness consequences, platform 
of trust, cooperation, and turn-taking. Interaction Studies, 19(1–2), 167–182. 
Wacewicz, S., Żywiczyński, P., & Orzechowski, S. (2016). Visible movements of the 
orofacial area. Gesture, 15(2), 250–282. 
Zlatev, J. (2008). The co-evolution of intersubjectivity and bodily mimesis. In J. Zlatev, T. 
Racine, C. Sinha, & E. Itkonen (Eds.), The shared mind: Perspectives on 
intersubjectivity (pp. 215–244). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
Zlatev, J. (2014). Bodily mimesis and the transition to speech. In M. Pina & N. Gontier 
(Eds.), The evolution of social communication in primates (pp. 165–178). Lisbon: 
Springer. 
Zlatev, J., Persson, T., & Gärdenfors, P. (2005). Triadic bodily mimesis is the difference. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(05), 720–721. 
 
Zlatev, J., Wacewicz, S., Żywiczyński, P., & van de Weijer, J. (2017). Multimodal-first or 
pantomime-first? Communicating events through pantomime with and without 
vocalization. Interaction Studies, 18, 465–488. 
Zuberbühler, K. (2013). Acquired mirroring and intentional communication in primates. 
Language and Cognition, 5(2–3), 133–143. 
Żywiczyński, P. (2018). Language origins: From mythology to science. Frankfurt am Main: 
Peter Lang.  
Żywiczyński, P., Gontier, N., & Wacewicz, S. (2017). The evolution of (proto-)language: 
Focus on mechanisms. Language Sciences, 63, 1–11. 
Żywiczyński, P., Wacewicz, S., & Sibierska, M. (2018). Defining pantomime for language 
evolution research. Topoi, 37(2), 307–318. doi:10.1007/s11245-016-9425-9 
